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INTRODUCTION
As fault-tolerant computer systems grow in complexity, assessment of the
reliability of such systems similarly increases in difficulty. Realistic
models of fault-tolerant systems can easily have several thousands of states.
As models get larger, though, manual derivation of the exact unreliability or
even the manual derivation of an approximation for the unreliability becomes
impracticable. Thus, the reliability of a system based on a large or complex
model has to be calculated numerically.
Markov models of highly reliable, fault-tolerant computer systems typically
have both slow and fast transition rates -- the slow rates corresponding to
fault arrivals and the fast rates corresponding to a system's response (such as
reconfiguration) to a fault. To calculate the death-state probabilities and,
hence, the reliability of a system based on such a Markov model, a system of
stiff differential equations must be solved. However, the solution of a system
of stiff differential equations is plagued with numerical difficulties. Thus,
other approaches have been developed to estimate reliability.
To estimate the reliability of state-of-the-art fault-tolerant computer
architectures, automated tools such as CARE III (Computer-Aided Reliability
Estimation), SURE (Semi-Markov Unreliability Range Evaluator), PAWS (Pad_
Approximation With Scaling), and STEM (Scaled Taylor Exponential Matrix) have
been created (ref. 1 and 2). CARE III has been developed over several years
estimatethe reliabilityof a systembasedon a givenmodel. Sincethesetools
were developedto assesshighlyreliable,fault-tolerantsystems,the solutions
to the reliabilitymodelsshouldbe sufficientlyaccurateto permitengineering
judgementsto be made aboutthe systemunderstudy. Overestimationof
reliabilitycan supportacceptanceof a systemwith inadequatereliability
while underestimation can support rejection of a well-designed system.
During the testing of the SURE program, the unreliability estimates given by
CARE III, PAWS, and STEM were used to check the accuracy of the bounds that the
SURE program gives on the unreliability of a system based on a semi-Markov
model. Some of the answers given by CARE III differed by several orders of
magnitude from the answers given by SURE, PAWS, and STEM; and, even more
importantly, the answers given by CARE III for several test cases were not
conservative in comparison to the other estimates. In each case, the CARE III
program did not give any warning that the estimates may not be accurate or
conservative.
Descriptions of CARE III, SURE, PAWS, and STEM
The CARE III reliability analysis tool was originally codeveloped by the
Raytheon Company and the NASA Langley Research Center. This program implements
a solution technique that incorporates behavioral decomposition and aggregation
to evaluate the reliability of systems. The solution technique reduces the
solution of a complex model to the solution of two relatively simpler models: a
coverage model that is a semi-Markov process, and a reliability model that is a
non-homogeneous, Markov process (ref. 3). This solution technique involves an
approximation which is not characterized via a mathematical error analysis in
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the program. Figure 1 shows CARE III's single fault-handling (coverage) model.
Although several types of fault-handling behavior can be represented by the
CARE III model, the models in this report are very basic constructions. To
simplify CARE III's fault-handling model, the following parameter values were
" used; PB= 0, PA= I, C= i, p= 0, and €= 0. Since these parameters either can
not be measured or are very difficult to measure, these values are typically
used. With these parameter values, the fault-handling model reduces to the
simple model shown in figure 2.
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Figure 2.- CARE III's single fault-handling model simplified.
TO solve both the fault-handling and fault-occurrence models, numerical
integration techniques are used. To input a model into CARE III, fault trees
are used to describe the fault-occurrence behavior, and the fault-handling
behavior is described by the parameters of the semi-Markov model. Since a
semi-Markov model is included in CARE III, distributions other than the
exponential can be used to describe fault-handling behavior. For the models
given in this report, though, only exponential transition rates were
considered.
The SURE program provides an alternative approach to the difficult task of
solving convolution integrals traditionally used to determine the reliability
of a system modeled by a semi-Markov model. SURE gives lower and upper bounds,
developed by White (ref. 4), on the death-state probabilities of a semi-Markov
model. Using these bounds on the individual death-state probabilities, lower
and upper bounds on the total unreliability of a modeled system are determined;
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and, these bounds have been demonstrated to be mathematically rigorous (ref.
4). Since the bounds implemented in SURE are algebraic in form, they are
relatively simple to compute. Hence, the numerical stability problems that
often occur when solving systems of stiff differential equations do not exist
" in this program. Models are input to SURE by simply enumerating all of the
state transitions in the model.
The PAWS program is used to compute the reliability of a pure Markov model. As
mentioned above, the reliability of a system modeled with a pure Markov model
can be determined by solving a system of differential equations. PAWS uses a
combination of Pad@ approximations, scaling, and squaring techniques to compute
a matrix exponential needed to solve this system of equations and, hence,
determine the death-state probabilities of a Markov model (ref. 5). In fact,
this method of finding the matrix exponential is considered to be one of the
most efficient algorithms known (ref. 6). A conservative estimate of the
number of digits of accuracy in the unreliability estimate is also given along
with the output of the death-state probabilities. PAWS is limited, though, to
pure Markov models and can not handle very large models (models with more than
300 states). PAWS also uses the same input format as SURE.
Another reliability analysis tool called STEM (Scaled Taylor Exponential
Matrix) ,whichwas developed at NASA Langley Research Center does have the
capability to compute the exact death state probabilities for Markov models as
large as i000 states. The underlying mathematics in STEM involves the
calculation of the matrix exponential where the matrix exponential is defined
via a Taylor series (ref. 7 and 8). The Taylor series is truncated in the
program, and a conservative error estimate of the truncation is produced. The
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STEM program uses the same input language as SURE and outputs the death-state
probabilities along with the error estimate.
The following three models were used in testing of the SURE program. For each
of the examples, the system is described and the Markov model is presented
along with a table that gives the final unreliability estimates from SURE,
PAWS, STEM, and CARE III. The number of digits of accuracy that are reported
for PAWS and STEM are given in brackets beside the corresponding unreliability
estimate. The input files used with each tool for the first three models are
located in the appendix. The input files used with the last two models are
very similar to the input files for model 3 since the systems in each of these
examples are basically the same structure. A range of parameter values were
used when running each model in order to show the region where the CARE III
estimates become nonconservative. The mission time used in each test case was
i0 hours. The cases where CARE III overestimates the reliability of the
modeled system by underestimating the unreliability are marked in the tables
with an "#" symbol.
Examplei: Simple Triad
The first example is a Markov model of a triad of components with no spares.
The system degrades with a component failure rate _ and a fault-recovery rate
6. Only permanent faults are considered. Two faults that arrive before the
system can reconfigure will cause system failure; and, only one functioning
component is necessary for the system to be operational. The model for this
example is given in figure 3.
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Figure 3.- Model i: Markov model of a triplex with permanent faults.
Table I.- Comparison of SURE, PAWS, STEM, and CARE III for Model 1
TotalSystemUnreliabilityGivenby EachTool
P_ SURE_ PAWS STI_ CAREIII CAREI£I*
x- leO3
%- le+02 (1.42254e-06,1.60300e-06) 1.57267e-06[9] 1.57267e-06[41 1.57588e-06 1.57588e-06
X- Ie-04
&- le+08 (9.98495e-I0,1.0000!e-09) 9.98507e-i0[3] 9.98507e-I0[4] 9.98501e-I0 9.98501e-I0
X= le-6
S- le+2 _5.48422e-13,6.01003e-13) 6.00388e-13[9] 6.00388e-13[4} 6.00658e-13 6.00658e-13
.k-7e-7
_- le+4 _3.25497e-15,3.2830!e-15) 3.18293e-15[7] 3.18293e-15[3] 3.29291e-15 3.29291e-15
),-6e-7
S- le+4 (2.35560e-15,1.37601e-15) 2.37595e-15[7] 2.37595e-15[3] 2.38329e-15 2.38329e-15
x-5e-7
S- le+4 (1.61096e-15,1.62500e-15) 1.62497e-15[7] 1.62497e-15[3} 1.24599e-16# 1.63006e-15
k_ le-7
6- le_2 (5.47623e-15,6.00100e-15) 5.99499e-15[9] 5.99499e-15[4] 9.99999e--19# 5.99766e-15
X- le-7
&- le+4 (6.04593e-17,6.10000e-17) 6.09993e-17[7] 6.09993e-17[3] 9.99999e-19# 6.12029e-17
_- le-7
&- le+8 (I.00599e-18,1.00600e-18) 1.00600e-18{3] 1.00600e-18[4] 9.99999e-19| l.O0602e-iB
A- 5e-7
&- le-_-3 (1.47007e-14, 1.51250e-14) 1.51233e-14 [8_ 1.51233e-14 [5] 1.24999e-16| 1.51289e-14
X- le--08
&- le+02 (5.47543e-17,6.00010e-17) 5.99410Q-17[9] 5.99410e-17[41 1.00000e-Zi@ 5.99676e-17
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The unreliability estimates listed under the CARE III column were obtained by
running CARE III with all of the default run-time parameters while the values
in the CARE III* column were obtained by dramatically reducing one of CARE
III's run-time parameters PSTRNC. I When the above test cases were run with CARE
III with the default run-time parameters, many of the resulting unreliability
estimates in cases where l was very small differed from the other estimates
by several orders of magnitude. These estimates were not conservative, and no
warning messages were output. In some of the cases, though, the portion of
unreliability that CARE III attributed to fault handling was reported to be 0.
This information served as a clue that varying the value of PSTRNC, which is
used in controlling the calculation of the fault-handling unreliability, may
affect CARE III's estimate. All of the run-time parameter values were varied;
however, only variation of PSTRNC yielded any significant change in CARE III's
output. Reducing the PSTRNC parameter, whose default value is 10-I° , to 10-3o
enabled CARE III to give a conservative reliability estimate in each of the
test cases shown.
Example 2: Critical-pair Five-plex
Example 2 consists of a system of five components that are critically paired
and are susceptible to intermittent faults. The parameters of the model, shown
in figure 4 are defined as follows: i is the fault-arrival rate, _ is the rate
at which an intermittent fault goes from the active to benign state, 8 is the
1 The PSTRNC parameter is used to limit the number of fault vectors that CARE
III uses in computing the fault-handling unreliability. Only the fault
vectors whose module depletion probability is less than PSTRNC will be
included in the fault-handling unreliability calculation (p. 31, ref. i).
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rate at which an intermittent fault goes from the benign to active state, and
is the permanent fault-recovery rate.
Figure 4.- Model 2: Critical pair 5-plex with intermittent faults.
Table 2.- Comparison of SURE, PAWS, STEM and CARE III for Model 2.
Total SFst_-_nreli_ility GiVen W r-ch _I
F_ _ BOUNDS P_ _ CAREIll CARE Ill •
\- le--6
_-, 3.6e-3
6- Le-2
_- 3.6e+6 _5.55288e-17 5.55564e-17) 5.55550e-17[4] 5.55550e-17[21 5.57649e-17 5.576.=ae-17
i- le-6
_- 3.6e-2
6- Ie+I
&- 3.6e+2 5.19698e-13 5.55674e-13 5.55449e-13[7] 5.55449e-13[4] 5.5702Be-13 5.57036e-13
I- le-6
_- ].6e-i
6- le-I
&- 3.6e+2 5.29530e-13 5.55417e-13 5.55249e-13[7] 5.55249e-13[4] 5.53959e-131 5.53967e-131
_- 2e-7
_- 3.6e-3
6- 3. _e-2
&- 3.6e+1 1.90313e-13 2.22230e-13 2.21589e-13[81 2.21589e-13[6] 3.1999Be-29# 2.21615e-13
_- le-7
c,-3.6
_- le-I
6- 3.6e+2 5.28272e-15,5.54082e-15 5.53926e-15[71 5.53926e-15[4] 9.99998e-311 5.50788e-15|
I.,1e--8
c,-ie-i
_]-le+2
&- le+6 1.99821e-20 2.00000e-20 2.00000e-20[41 2.00000e-20[3] 1.00000e-35# 2.00275e-20
I.,le-4
_- le+2
le+l
&,, 1e4-3 2.1.]068e.-09 2.19804o-09) 2.19131e-09 [61 2.19131e-09 [5] 2.18797e-09# 2.18797e-091
The appendix of CARE IIl's users guide (D-2, ref. i) states that separation of
the values of the fault-handling parameters by more than two or three orders of
magnitude may cause numerical inaccuracies; but, the nature of the inaccuracies
are not explained. Since some of the above test cases infringe on this caveat,
CARE III's estimates in these cases might be expected to differ from the
estimates given by SURE, PAWS, and STEM. However, the last case in particular
contains rates that are readily accepted as reasonable rates for highly
reliable, fault-tolerant computer systems modeled with CARE III.
The resultslistedunder the CARE III* columnwere obtainedby reducingthe
I0
PSTRNCparameterof the program.As in exampleI, manyof the unreliability
estimatesgivenby CAREIll when thedefaultrun-timeparameterswereused
(shownin the firstCARE IIIcolumn)deviatedfromtheotherresultsby several
o,
ordersof magnitude.No warningmessageswereoutputby CARE Ill to alertthe
user thatthe reliabilityestimateis not conservative,although,as in example
I, the amountof unreliabilityattributedto faulthandlingwas reportedto be
0.
In some of the cases where CARE III overestimated the reliability, the fault-
arrival rate _ was very small. This fault-arrival rate is a somewhat smaller
failure rate than is typically assumed for components of a computer system.
However, with the rapid evolution of electronic components, failure rates of
this magnitude are now being assigned to components as can be seen in the
failure rates suggested for the avionic reliability study for the Entry
Research Vehicle. 2 No suggestions were made in the user's guide or the
program's output to decrease the PSTRNC parameter in cases where the fault-
arrival rate was very small. However, CARE III user's guide states that the
range for the X parameter includes all values > 0.0 (p. 43 ref. i). Once the
PSTRNC value was reduced, though, the portion of unreliability that CARE III
attributed to fault handling increased; and, the final reliability estimate
tended to converge to the estimates given by PAWS, STEM, and SURE in several of
the cases.
2 Dzwonczyk,M.;Adams,S.; McKinney,M.; Esielionis,J.: AvionicReliability
Study for the Entry Research Vehicle. ERV-87-05, January 23, 1987.
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The CARE III" estimates may be considered good enough for use by engineering
judgement since these estimates are very close to the estimates given by the
other tools. However, some of the CARE III° estimates were still not
conservative compared to the PAWS and STEM estimates which agree to at least 6
digits. More importantly, the reason CARE III's estimates in these cases do
not converge to a conservative estimate is not evident.
Example 3: Triad with Transient Faults
Model 3, in figure 5, is a triad of components susceptible to transient faults.
Two faults which occur before recovery can take place will cause system
failure; otherwise, the system degrades until there are no more functioning
components. The fault-arrival rate is given by _, the fault-recovery rate is
given by 6, and the transient fault-recovery rate is given by _.
6
6
Figure 5.- Model 3: Triad with transient faults.
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Table 3.- Comparison of SURE, PAWS, STEM, and CARE III for Model 3.
TotalSyst_ UnreliabilityGiven by Each Tool
PARAHETERS SURE BOt_DS PAWS _ CARE III
" ),=le-03
6- le+05
_- le+03 (9.65236e-07,9.81015e-07) 9.66415e-07[6] 9.66415e-07[4] 9.63961e-07#
),=le--08
6- le+07
=- le+02 (1.59975e-21,1.59997e-21) 1.59997e-21[4] 1.59997e-21[3] 1.31233e-21#
I- le-_4
_=.le+04
_- le-Ol (I.05275e-09,1.06001e-09) 1.05836e-09[7] 1.05836e-09[3] 1.03322e-09#
_,-ie-06
&- le+03
_- le-02 (5.92900e-14,6.09997e-14) 6.09922e-14[7] 6.09922e-14[5] 3.10625e-]_4#
_- le-04
6- le+03
Q- le+00 (1.55489e-09,1.59771e-09) 1.59465e-09[8] 1.59465e-09[5] 1.29556e-09#
X- le-05
_- le+02
=- le+_5 (5.97717e--14,5.99500e-14) 5.99410e-14[6] 5.99410e-14[4] 1.69753e--14#
In all of the test cases, the unreliability estimates given by CARE III are not
conservative. No warning messages or any other indication was given by CARE
III in any of these cases to inform the user that the unreliability estimate
may not be conservative. Many attempts were made by varying the run-time
parameters to get CARE III to give a conservative estimate; but, the estimates
were the same regardless of the variation in the run-time parameters.
The following two models were not a part of the testing of the SURE program.
These two models were developed to serve as a preliminary investigation of the
error in the transient model seen in example 3. The next two models are simple
critical-pair configurations as in example 3 except these next models contain
more components to test the hypothesis that as the size of the model increases,
so does the CARE III's error in analyzing the transient model.
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Example4: 7-PlexwithTransientFaults
Model 4, in figure 6, is a system of 7 identical components susceptible to
transient faults. Two faults which occur before recovery can take place will
cause system failure; otherwise, the system degrades until there are no more
functioning components. The fault-arrival rate is A, the fault-recovery rate
is 6, and the transient fault-recovery rate is e.
Figure 6.- Model 4: 7-Plex with transient faults.
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Table 4.- Comparison of SURE, PAWS, STEM, and CARE III for Model 4.
TotalSystemUnreliabilityGiven by EachTool
P_ Stm£ BOU_S P_'s STem CARE III
I= le-4
6- le+3 (3.78529e-I03.83123e-i0) 3.81780e-I0[7] 3.81780e-i0[31 6.28699e-Ii#
=- le+4
i- le-7
&- le+2 (4.12149e-164.15843e-16) 4.15837e-16[7] 4.15837e-16[3] 6.49649e-17#
_- le+4
X- le-8
&- le+5 (4.18395e-194.19581e-19) 4.19580e-19[6] 4.19580e-19[4] 7.01660e-201
_- le+2
X- le-6
6- le+l (4.15838e-14 4.19595e-14) 4.19576e-14 [71 4.19576e-14 []] 5.06318e-15#
_- le+4
k- le--7
_- le+5 (3.81493e-18,3.81819e-18) 3.81818e-18[5] 3.81818e-18[5] 6.38098e-19#
_-le+6
X- le-5
&- le+3 (4.19205e-144.19727e-14) 4.19580e-14[5] 4.19580e-14[3] 5.28975e-15#
_-le+6
k= Le--4
&- le+5 (4.14259e-Ii,4.16887e-II) 4.154]0e-Ii[6] 4.15430e-11[4] 6.94510e-12#
_-le+3
Recall from example 3 that CARE III's unreliability estimates agreed with the
estimates from the other tools to at least one significant digit in several of
the test cases. However, as seen in table 4, CARE III's estimates differ from
the other estimates for the above model by almost an order of magnitude in each
test case.
Example 5: 12-Plexwith TransientFaults
Model5, in figure7, is a systemof 12 identicalcomponentsthatis
- susceptibleto transientfaults. Two faultswhichoccurbeforerecoverycan
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take place will cause system failure; otherwise, the system degrades until
there are no more functioning components. The fault-arrival rate is _, the
fault-recovery rate is 6, and the transient fault-recovery rate is _.
Figure 7.- Model 5: 12-Plex with transient faults.
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Table5.-Comparisonof SURE,PAWS,STEM,and CAKE III forModel5.
Total System _reliability Given by Each Tool
.pA_A_-_RS _m_ _ PAWS STEm CARE 11I
),-le-4
6-le+3 (i.18964e-09,1.20712e-09)1.19988e-09[71 1.19988e-09[3] 1.07777e-I0#
_- le+4
l-le-7
6-le+2 (1.29533e-15,.30694e-15)1.30692e-15[7| 1.30692e-15[3] 1.I1368e-16#
_- le+4
k-le-8
6- le+5 (1.31495e-18,1.31868e-18) 1.31868e-18[6] 1.31868e-18[4] 1.20284e-19#
_- le+2
_-!e-6
_-le+l (i.30692e-13,.31876e-13)1.31867e-13[7} 1.31867e-13[3] 8.67973e-15#
c_ le+4
_- le-7
6- le+5 (I.19898e-17,i.2000le-17) 1.20000e-17[51 1.20000e-17[5] 1.09388e-18#
_-le+6
_-le-5
&-le+3 (1.31750e-13,.31847e-13)1.31868e-13[5] 1.31868e-13[3] 9.06815e-15#
=-ie+6
),- le-4
8- Ie+5 (1.3019k_--I0, 1.31350e--i0) 1.3Q564e-lO [6] 1.30564e-i0 [4] 1.19059e--ii#
_, le+]
In eachof thesetestcases,CARE III'sunreliabilityestimatesdifferfromthe
otherestimatesby more thanan orderof magnitude.Althoughexamples4 and 5
are stillelementarymodels,theydo indicatethatas a modelthat incorporates
transientfaultsincreasesin size,the errorin CAREIII'sunreliability
estimatealso increases.
CONCLUSIONS
o" ThereareparameteregionsinCAKEIIIwhichcausetheprogramto severely
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overestimate the reliability'of a modeled system without warning the user. The
source of the error in the CARE III estimates is not known; however, in the
case of models that consider transient fault occurrences, the error appears to
increase as larger models are analyzed. The CARE III user's guide states many
restrictions, assumptions, and constraints that should be observed when using
the program. However, there are many subtleties involved when modeling a
system with CARE III. CARE III program also does not explicitly test for some
of the parameter regions where the program does not perform correctly.
Consequently, even an experienced user of CARE III unaware of all of the many
subtleties of the program could easily generate wrong answers without any
warning.
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APPENDIX
The followingis the input file used with SURE, PAWS, and STEM for model i.
1,2= 3*LAMBDA;
2,3= 2*LAMBDA;
2,4= FAST DELTA;
4,5= 2*LAMBDA;
5,6= LAMBDA;
5,7= FAST DELTA;
7,8= LAMBDA;
RUN;
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The input file used with CARE III for model 1 follows.
$FHMNAMES
FHMNAME( 1)= 'PERMANENT'
SEND
SFLTrYP
NFTYPS=I,
ALP= 0.0 ,
BET= 0.0 ,
DEL= i.0e+02 ,
RHO= 0.0 ,
EPS= 0.0 ,
IDELF= 1 ,
IRHOF= 1 ,
IEPSF= 1 ,
MARKOV= 1 ,
PA= 1.0 ,
PB= O.0 ,
C= 1.0 ,
LGTMST=T
SEND
SSTGNAMES
STGNAME (1)= 'PROCESSORS '
SEND
$STAGES
NSTGES=I, !
N= 3,
M= i,
NSUB= 0,
MSUB= 0,
LC= 0,
IRLPCD=I,
RLPLOX_-F,IAXSRL=2
SEND
$FLTCAT
NFCATS=I,
JTYP(I,i)= i,
OMG(i,1)= i.0 ,
RLM(I,I)=i.000000E-03
SEND
SRNTIME
lO.oooo ,TTBASF.:I,
PSTRNC: 0.100000E-09,
QPTRNC= 0.100000E-01,
NPSBRN=20,
CKDATA=T,
SYSFLG=F, CPLFLG=T
SEND
MODEL 1
1344
1 1 3
4 2123
2O
The following is the input file used with SURE, PAWS, and STEM for model 2.
1,2 = 5*LAMBDA; 26 27 3*LAMBDA;
2,3= 4*LAMBDA; 27,28 2*LAMBDA;
2,4 = FAST ALPHA; 27,29 FAST ALPHA;
4,2 = BETA; 29,27 BETA;
4,5 = 4*LAMBDA; 29,30 2*LAMBDA;
5,6 = 3*LAMBDA; 30,31 LAMBDA;
" 5,3 = BETA; 30 28 BETA;
5,7 = FAST ALPHA; 30_32 FAST ALPHA;
7,5 = 2*BETA; 32_30 2*BETA;
7,8 = 3*LAMBDA; 32 33 LAMBDA;
8,9 = 2*LAMBDA; 27 34 FAST DELTA;
8,6 = 2*BETA; 30 35 FAST DELTA;
8,10 = FAST ALPHA; 34 35 2*LAMBDA;
10,8 = 3*BETA; 35 36 LAMBDA;
10,11 = 2*LAMBDA;
ii,12 = LAMBDA;
11,9 = 3*BETA;
ii,13 = FAST ALPHA;
13,11 = 4*BETA;
13,14 = LAMBDA;
2,15 = FAST DELTA;
5,18 = FAST DELTA;
8,21 = FAST DELTA;•
11,24 = FAST DELTA;
15,16 = 4*LAMBDA;
16,17 = 3*LAMBDA;
16,18 = FAST ALPHA;
18,16 = BETA;
18,19 = 3*LAMBDA;
19,20 = 2*LAMBDA;
19,17 = BETA;
19,21 = FAST ALPHA;
21,19 = 2*BETA;
21,22 = 2*LAMBDA;
22,23 = LAMBDA;
22,20 = 2*BETA;
22,24 = FASTALPHA;
24,22 = 3*BETA;
24,25 = LAMBDA;
16,26 = FAST DELTA;
19,29 = FAST DELTA;
22,32 = FAST DELTA;
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The followingis the input file used with CARE III for model 2.
$_s
FHMNAME(1)= 'INTERMITIIENT'
SEND
SFLTIXP
NFTYPS=I,
ALP= 3.6e+5 ,
BET=- i.0e-5 ,
DEL= 3.6e+2 ,
RHO= 0.0 ,
EPS= 0.0 ,
IDELF= 1 ,
IRHOF= 1 ,
IEPSF= 1 ,
MARKOV= 1 ,
PA= i.0 ,
PB= 0.0 ,
C= 1.0 ,
LGTMST=T
SEND
SS_NAMES
STGNAME (1)= 'PROCESSORS '
SEND
$STAGES
NSTGES=I,
N= 5,
M= i,
NSUB= 0,
MSUB= 0,
LC= 0,
IRLPCD=I,
RLPL(YI_-F,IAXSRI_2
SEND
SFLTCAT
NFCATS=I,
JTYP(I,I)= i,
OMG(I,I)= 1.0 I
RiM(I,1)=1.000000E-02
SEND$RNTIME
FT= i0.0000 ,ITBASE=I,
PSTRNC=0.100000E-09,
QPTRNC= 0.100000E-01,
NPSBRN=20,
CKDATA=T,
SYSFLG=F,CPLFLC_T
SEND
MODEL 2
1566
115
6 212345
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The followingis the input file used with SURE, PAWS, and STEM for model 3.
1,2 = 3*LAMBDA;
2,3 = 2*LAMBDA;
- 2,1 = ALPHA;
2,4 = FAST DELTA;
4,5= 2*LAMBDA;
5,6= AMBDA;
5,4 = :YLPHA;
5,7= FASTDELTA;
7,8 = LAMBDA;
LIST = 2;
RUN;
J
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The followingis the input file used with CARE Ill for model 3.
$_me4A_ES
FHMNAME(] )= 'TRAN.qTF?FYP'
SEND
$FLTTYP
NFTYPS=l,
ALP= 1.0e+03 ,
BET=- 0.0 ,
DEL= i.0e+05 ,
RHO= 0.0 ,
EPS= 0.0 ,
IDELF= 1 ,
IRHOF= 1 ,
IEPSF= 1 ,
MARKOV= 1 ,
PA= i.0 ,
PB= 0.0 ,
C= 1.0 ,
LGTMST=-T
SEND
SSTGNAMES
STC44AME(1)= 'PROCESSORS'
SEND
$STAGES
NSTGES=I,
N= 3,
M= l,
NSUB= 0,
MSUB= 0,
LC= 0,
IRLPCD=I,
RLPLOT=F,IAXSRL=2
SEND
$FLTCAT
NFCATS=I,
JTYP(I,I)= i,
OMG(I,I)= 1.0 ,
RLM(i,1)= i.000000E-03
SEND
SRNTIME
FT=- 10.0 ,ITBASE=I,
PSTRNC= 0.100000E-30,
QPTRNC= 0.100000E-10,
NPSBRN=20,
CKDATA=T,
SYSFLG_F,CPLFLG=T
SEND
MODEL 3
1344
113
4 2123
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